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of the Region 
1945-1990
by Perry Anderson
There is now an extensive literature on the idea and reality of the 
nation - nationality - nationalism, most of it the product of the last 
three decades. To date, the notion and phenomenon of the region, 
and of regionalism, lack a comparable body of research and 
theory. If we are to develop one, a necessary starting-point would 
seem to be some reflection on the term 'region' itself. The remarks 
that are follow are simple-minded enough. Their intention is 
merely to contribute to discussion in the Forum of some of the 
possible conditions of the modern regional phenomenon in 
Western Europe.1
1 I would like to thank especially my colleagues Michael Muller, Steen 
Bo Frandsen and Stuart Woolf for their critical comments on a verbal 




























































































1. The Idea of a Region
The term 'region' is an old one in all European languages with a 
major Latin word-stock, typically coming into use in the 14th 
century; arriving later and employed much less frequently in 
German, and other non-Latinate idioms. Its signification was 
two-fold: indicating on the one hand, the demarcation of a geo­
graphical territory, vaguely associated with the sense of 'rule' 
(regere); and on the other, a portion or sub-division of any wider 
referent: the heavens, the sciences, the parts of the body, and so 
on. From the outset, the term was highly indeterminate—floating 
between the specifically territorial and the generically sectoral, 
and lending itself to any number of metaphorical applications or 
extensions. For our purposes, the important point to note is that 
—perhaps in good measure just for this reason—the term 'region' 
was never central in the political vocabulary of the early modern 
state.2 The administrative terms used to denote territorial sub­
divisions within the framework of absolutist or semi­
constitutionalist rule varied, of course, by zone and over time: 
pays, Land, liin, shire, etc. But in common discourse, there came to 
be one word of more or less universal currency: 'province'. Its 
origins were unambiguous—provincia in Latin designating a 
territory conquered by Rome. This was the normal term of refer­
ence, in all major European languages, for the distinct parts of a 
realm. Its semantic dominance was not affected by the great 
changes of the Neuzeit. Paradoxically, indeed, as the heteroclite 
particular demarcations within the various anciens régimes were 
eroded or overthrown in the late 18th or 19th centuries, the gene­
2 The most celebrated use of the term in its own way makes the point. 
The principle of cuius regio, eius religio, which came into use as a 
gloss on the Peace of Augsburg—it was not used in the recess itself—  
conceded to each ruler the right to determine the doctrine professed 





























































































ral term was actually strengthened. As late as 1927-28, Ortega 
could entitle a work proposing a fundamental political overhaul of 
the Spanish state, La Redencion de las Provincias.
But this inter-war text, expressly playing on the ambiguities of the 
term—Ortega spurned provincianismo, the better to exalt 
provincialismo—was perhaps the last major usage of the term in 
European political literature.3 In the post-war world, the term 
'province' has faded away, ceasing to form part of acceptable dis­
course. The reason for this is clear. From the beginning, the term 
had a secondary connotation, related to its Roman origins. 
Provinces existed not just as a division of a realm, it in opposition 
to its capital—as rustic periphery to polished centre. The source of 
this contrast was French. Pejorative reference to 'provincial' 
culture and manners can be found as early as Montaigne, and is a 
commonplace by the time of Madame de Sevigne. Bourbon cen­
tralization in the time of Louis XIV gave it virtually canonical 
force. From France, the associated meaning spread throughout 
Europe. By the early 18th century, Samuel Johnson's dictionary in 
England treats 'provincial' as more or less a synonym of bucolic. 
By the 19th century, when the earlier antithesis between court and 
country—onto which the opposition between capital and 
provinces had been mapped—had ceased to be active, scorn for 
provincialism if anything intensified, becoming a standard topos 
of mid-century French literature—Gautier, Sand, Flaubert—in 
particular. It is thus clear enough why the term 'province' should 
have lost credit in the polite vocabulary of politics, once universal 
suffrage became a 20th century norm.4 The hierarchy of values it
3 José Ortega y Gasset, 'La Redencion de las Provincias', in O bras  
Complétas, Vol. XI, Madrid 1983, p. 232 ff: originally a series of articles 
in El Sol.
4 In Germany a standard lexicon like Paul H erre's P o li t is c h e s  
H andw orterbuch, (Leipzig 1923) contained lengthy entries on 
Provinzen  and P rovinzialautonom ie, but nothing on Region n o r  
Regionalismus. Perhaps the sharpest illustration of the change can be 
seen in Italy, where the first edition (Turin 1976) of the distinguished




























































































conveyed was incompatible with the equality of respect on which 
the conventions of post-war citizenship were based.
The rise of the idea of 'region' to its modern salience was thus an 
effect of the fall of the traditional notion of 'province'. In post-war 
conditions, the very indeterminacy of the concept of region was to 
its advantage. Affectively, it was neutral—without strong moral 
or cultural valency. Intellectually, its wide extension made it an 
ideal means for the fusion of quite distinct types of spatial unit into 
a single persuasive figure, within a mobilizing rhetoric. Thus there 
was a long-standing geographical notion of a 'natural region', as 
an ecologically bounded zone, demarcated by climate, fauna, soil, 
rivers, mountains, etc., going back to Humboldt. There was a 
much more recent idea of an 'economic region', deriving from the 
work of Von Thiinen (who did not use the term itself) and 
concerned with patterns of industrialization. There was the older 
political sense of the term as an administrative unit within a 
sovereign state—but also the diplomatic usage denoting an area 
containing several such states: here the level of the 'region' could 
point at systems either below or above that of the 'nation'. Finally, 
and most recently as a standard locution, there has emerged the 
idea of a 'cultural region'—that is, a community bounded by either 
customs and traditions (the weaker version), or language and 
literature (the stronger version). These four significations are 
quite distinct in origin, and, of course, by no means coincident in 
distribution. But they are readily condensed into a single 
polyvalent sign.
Dizionario di Politica, edited by Norberto Bobbio and Nicola Matteucci, 
still contains a conventional entry under provincia (there is a longer 
one on regionalismo) — that disappears in the enlarged second edition 




























































































2. The Valorization of the Region
If the usage of 'province' fell out of favour, as compromised by a 
pejorative cultural undertone, leaving the field free for 'region' as 
a neutral term, which had the further advantage of wide poly- 
semic leeway, the question still remains to answered: what 
converted a notion that was was originally indeterminate and 
subsequently at best versatile, into one with an unambiguously 
positive valency? The historical change in this regard is very 
marked. When the term 'region' first acquired a political ring, in 
the later 19th century, the consensus was overwhelmingly against 
it. If 'regionalism' was accepted in literature, as a minor but 
harmless sub-genre, regionalism in politics was condemned by 
most contemporaries as a regressive recalcitrance against the 
unity of the nation. English commentators attributed the neolo­
gism to more backward peoples, where the phenomenon must 
have arisen—the French, or worse still, Spanish; French lexico­
graphers in turn thought the Italians were responsible. Isolated 
voices defended regional values, appealing to the federalist tra­
dition associated with Proudhon. But the typical enlightened 
judgement was that of Piero Gobetti, no doctrinaire centralist, 
contemplating his country in the early 20th century:
The basis for decentralization must not be the region, since quite 
apart from the danger of an anti-unitary regionalism, it is 
evident that the region provides no clear or reliable principle of 
differentiation among us.5
Fifty years later, the conventions have radically changed. Today, 
affirmation of the value of regional loyalties and identities is all 
but universal, and endorsement of the principle of their political 
representation an increasingly prominent theme of official dis-
5 'La Riforma dell'Amministrazione', Opere Complete, Voi. I, Turin 
1960, p. 94: 'How is Piedmont to be distinguished from Lombardy? Is 




























































































course in Western Europe. There have, of course, been hold-outs 
like the Conservative Party in Britain or the MSI in Italy, which 
tended to denounce regional institutions of any kind with vehe­
mence. But such unabashed centralism is the exception rather than 
the rule today. The European Parliament, indeed, has adopted a 
'Charter of Regionalization' formally enjoining member states to 
institutionalize regional identities within them. In recent years, 
few political values have become as respectable as regions— 
however variable their interpretation may in practice remain. 
What accounts for this striking reversal, in no way foreseeable in 
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War?
A general process requires general explanations. Three significant 
forces, it may be suggested, have contributed to the rise of the 
region as a point of political identification across Western Europe. 
Chronologically, the first of these was the uneven economic 
development of post-war capitalism. The phenomenon of the 
'depressed region' was, of course, already well-established in the 
in ter-war period. But amidst the general hardships of the Slump 
and the War, it did not acquire undue salience. During the post­
war boom, on the other hand, the fate of those areas which did not 
share in the median rise of living-standards within each nation, 
whether because they were zones of declining industry, or of 
uncompetitive agriculture, stood out in greater, and socially more 
combustible, relief. Pressure for measures to redress the handicaps 
of relative disadvantage inevitably built up, giving a new meaning 
to regions—economic interest supplying collective bonds even 
where prior cultural identity was weak.
A second force was quite different in its impact, and even opposite 
in direction. At a somewhat later stage of development, the 
modernization and concentration of the means of mass communi­
cation started to create conditions of hitherto unprecedented 
cultural homogeneity within each nation-state of Western Europe, 
and eventually, of course, across them too. Television notoriously 
played the prime role in this process—which had its correlates in 




























































































saloons and supermarkets in even rural areas. Predictably, 
centralization of this kind in due course provoked local reactions. 
Other things being equal, most people want both material 
conditions similar to, and cultural distinctions setting them off 
from, those within existentially comparative range of them. 
Uneven economic development gave one impulse to regional 
identification; too even cultural development gave another. Since 
diversity is itself a central value of all official theories of culture— 
no-one today will be found championing uniformity, soulless by 
definition—regional claims to defend it have virtually automatic 
backing within national intellectual establishments themselves.
A third change, of course, has been the advent of the European 
Comunity itself. This has perhaps been the most remarked-upon 
influence. The emergence of supra-national administration, more 
distant from immediate experience than any previous public 
authority, has—as one would expect—put an understandable 
premium on sub-national administration, as a compensating 
mechanism. There has also been, one might argue, an element of 
collusion, as well as compensation, in the relationship between the 
two. For in so far as the new European institutions—in particular 
the Commission and the Parliament—have reason to try to bypass 
national authorities, in pursuit of closer union, they have logically 
had an interest in promoting regional institutions as lower-level 
partners: hence such initiatives as the Charter of Regionalization.
All three of these forces have certainly played important roles in 
the rise of the region as will and representation in Western Europe 
since the war. But another change has also been at work, which— 
it might be argued—has been the most important of all. This is so 
simple and fundamental an alteration that it is usually 
overlooked. Until 1945, the dominant ideological value in every 
West European society was the nation. That is, the supreme le­
gitimating discourse of public action was advance, or defense, of 
national interest or identity. This held good both for liberal- 
democratic and fascist-authoritarian regimes—antagonistic ide­
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the armed collision between them, any more than the contrast 
between parliamentarism and absolutism—also real enough— 
had been in the First World War. In 1939 British or German sol­
diers fought for their country, not for Westminster or National 
Socialism. The two great victors of the conflict, Churchill and 
De Gaulle, embodied this value-order, conceiving themselves as 
impersonations not of liberty but of the nation.6
After 1945, this changed. One reason was the mutual destruction 
wreaked by the War itself, that left every West European power, 
even the nominal winners, diminished. The old values of national 
self-assertion, triumphantly restated and extended at the Treaty 
of Versailles, emerged chastened and qualified—leading to the, 
Treaty of Rome and a Common Market that ended unconditional 
sovereignty. No-one is likely to underestimate the importance of 
this change. But prior to it there was actually a more decisive one. 
It was the onset of the Cold War which really shifted the value- 
hierarchy of legitimation in Western Europe. From 1947 onwards, 
the battle against Communism was fought, not in the name of the 
nation-state, but of the Free World. Factually, no West European 
state was in a position to lead the struggle: the hegemonic role, in 
coordinating or coercing the various nations into the North 
Atlantic pact, fell to the United States. Ideally, democracy became 
the prime internal justification of the existing social order— 
counterposed to its dictatorial opposite in Eastern Europe. 
National appeals were, of course, not ignored by leading 
European states in this period, any more than democratic themes 
had been neglected by the Entente powers in the pre-war period; 
but the values of nationality now receded to a secondary plane, 
yielding primary position in official discourse to the claims of 
liberty.
6 In the twenties Churchill was favourably disposed to fascism in Italy, 




























































































It was above all this permutation—we might speculate—which 
released the dynamic of the region. For on the one hand, it 
weakened the principal modern barrier to the growth of regional 
autonomy—namely, the doctrine of national unity as a virtually 
sacred pact, in the last resort trumping all other values. In 
Western Europe territorial claims by one state against another 
effectively disappeared, save in Ireland, neutralizing one power­
ful factor that had once often made local autonomy suspect to 
central authority. The nation now at once secured as a space and 
relativized as a code, the region could stir more freely within it. 
This was a negative condition—a lifting of restraints. On the 
other hand, the elevation of democracy into the supreme legiti­
mation of the social order, offered a positive opening to regional 
affirmation. Parliamentary systems based on univeral suffrage 
and civil rights afforded a compelling model of self-government. 
But d'id they exhaust the meaning of democracy, or the potential of 
popular sovereignty? Were they not—some impenitent spirits still 
asked—a trifle too abstract and diagrammatic, overly remote 
from ordinary citizens, to be regarded as the last historical word 
on the subject? These were unsettling thoughts, that might lead in 
a number of directions. But there was one which seemed 
straightforward and safe enough. Why should representative 
institutions be confined to the national level, necessarily quite 
distant from local life? Could they not be extended downwards to 
regional level, to Till out'—so to speak—the bare structures of 
decision-making at the centre? Nothing inherent in the doctrines 
of liberal democracy appeared to rule such a dédoublement out. At 
worst, regional bodies might be supererogatory—but they could 
not easily be held incompatible with national assemblies. 
Whatever the possible mediations between them, there had al­
ways been an undeniable tension between nation and region. 
Between democracy and region, by contrast, the relation might 
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3. National Variations
The conditions for a new valorization of the region just adduced 
are all completely general: in principle applicable equally to any 
West European state, once passed a certain threshold of socio­
economic development. In reality, as we know, there are marked 
differences in the position accorded regions between the countries 
of Western Europe. What explains these contrasts? It is tempting 
to look for the answer in the differential strength of local—-what 
might once have been called 'provincial'—identities within the 
respective nations. The overall pattern would then be something 
like the outcome of a uniform process falling across an accidented 
terrain, yielding necessarily variable results. There is no doubt 
that an analytic cartography of traditional identities below the 
level of the nation in Western Europe, and a set of distinctions for 
classifying their different types, are much needed. But this task is 
an essential complement to a study of the pattern of regionaliza­
tion, rather than the key to it. For, as a moment's reflection shows, 
the number of areas with a powerful sense of their own separate 
character is far smaller than that of the regions into which most of 
the EU is divided today. For every 'thick' entity like Bavaria, 
Vorarlberg, Veneto, Brittany, or Galicia, there are many more 
'thin' units like Murcia, Centre, Molise, Lower Saxony, Poitou- 
Charentes, etc. The process whereby such distinct kinds of zone 
have acquired a common political reality requires explanation in 
its own right.
The hypothesis advanced here is that three principal variables 
account for much of the pattern of regionalization in the EU. We 
can enumerate these as:
(i) the type of state that existed before the arrival of univer­
sal—not just manhood—suffrage;





























































































(iii) the presence or absence of allogenous cultural communities 
within the boundaries of the nation.
Let us briefly look at how these determinants may have worked 
themselves out in the five largest West European states, and 
conclude with a glance at the situation in the smaller countries.
If we take a comparative view, familiar episodes within the post­
war history of each nation appear in another light, and elements 
of a consistent pattern emerge.
We can begin with Germany, so far the only federal state in the 
Community. The extent to which the Second Reich created by 
Bismarck was a hybrid political structure—combining manhood 
suffrage and a vocal legislature with a substantially unaccount­
able executive, and reserved imperial powers—is well-known. 
For our purposes, the salient feature of its constitution was the 
preservation of twenty-two dynastic realms and three trading 
cities as formally autonomous units within the Empire, each with 
its own administrative and judicial machinery and specific 
Reservatrechte, together with representation in the Bundesrat. 
The long tradition of princely particularism in Germany was, in 
other words, not abolished but incorporated into the framework 
of national unity by Bismarck. There, however, it was in practice 
neutralized by the overwhelming preponderance of Prussia, 
covering two-thirds of the territory of the Reich and containing 
nearly three-quarters of its population.
After the Empire had collapsed at the end of the First World War, 
the Weimar Republic did not abolish or even redraw the tradi­
tional patchwork of units, apart for a minor consolidation in 
Thuringia. It simply converted the former states into Lander, and 
deprived them of real financial autonomy or significant constitu­
tional power, while leaving most of their other functions in 
place—a process of deduction rather than transformation, mov­
ing towards a unitary state without establishing one. With Hitler's 
seizure of power, a tightly centralized dictatorship was created, 




























































































powers to the Reich government, into which the Prussian 
administration was merged. But if the substance was destroyed, 
the shadow was preserved. Of the seventeen Weimar Lander, only 
Ltibeck was abolished, the others continuing to exist as 
administrative units, commanded by a Reichstatthalter—perhaps 
in memory of the role some of them had played in providing a 
tramplin for the Nazi rise to power.
With the defeat of the Third Reich and Allied occupation of 
Germany, a juridical tabula rasa was created. How was the pre­
sent constitutional structure built upon it? The strongly federal 
cast of the post-war republic in the West was the resultant of a 
number of convergent forces. There was the native tradition of 
pre-modern particularism, whose symbols even the Nazis had to 
some extent conserved. There was the destruction of Prussia, 
following Soviet-controlled annexation or occupation of its lands 
in the East, and division of them in the West. There was the initial 
reluctance of the Allies to see any central German authorities 
reemerge too quickly, which allowed local ones to entrench 
themselves. There was the subsequent pressure from the dominant 
power in the West, the United States, for the adoption of 
federalism as the tried and tested system of national safeguards at 
home. But dominating all of these was a common determination— 
shared by the post-war elites and occupation authorities in the 
West alike—to root democracy as firmly as possible in German 
soil, after the catastrophic experience of Nazism.
There were different conceptions of how to do this, and in the 
immediate aftermath of the war, one of the most widespread was 
the belief that, as the Social-Democratic Party put it in 1946:
Democracy in a capitalist state is in continuous danger...
German democracy needs socialism, or counter-revolutionary
forces will destroy it once again.7





























































































A year later, the CDU itself called for wide-ranging socialization 
to secure the new democracy, in its Ahlen Programme. By the time 
the Basic Law founding the Bundesrepublik was adopted in 1949, 
American and conservative pressures had forced these ideas to the 
side, although they left their trace in Article 15 of the new 
Constitution. The design of the Grundgesetz anchored German 
democracy, not in industrial but regional representation, confer­
ring substantial fiscal resources and political powers—especially 
in the cultural field—on the Lander, and entrenching their gover­
nments as delegations to the Upper Chamber of the national 
polity. The linkage between the alternative conceptions of de­
mocratic deepening is, however, still visible in the wording of 
Article 20: 'The Federal Republic is a democratic and social federal 
state'. Co-determination in heavy industry, already operative in 
the coal-fields, was extended to steel soon afterwords—less than 
the trade-unions or SPD wanted, but more than Adenauer or the 
employers liked.
The outcome of the Grundgesetz has been the most successful and 
durable regionalization of power in any major European state. 
But two paradoxes of that success are noticeable. The post-war 
Lander were in their great majority new creations. Only Bavaria 
could claim real historical continuity as a Fldchenstaat, and even 
its borders were modified. North-Rhine-Westphalia, Lower 
Saxony and Rhine-Palatinate were manufactured ex novo to suit 
the needs of the Occupation authorities, Baden-Württemberg was 
merged with difficulty, and Hesse doubled in size—while the 
anomalous enclaves of Hamburg and Bremen were retained. Yet 
no sooner in place, than this often arbitrary distribution took hold. 
There is some irony in the outcome. For forty years, the Federal 
Republic has combined the most far-reaching regionalization of 
any West European state with perhaps the least regionalism as a 
public issue—in fact, the very term for long remained a relatively 
infrequent import. One significant reason has been the absence of 
allogenous cultural communities, other than immigrants without 
citizenship: a national uniformity that set West Germany apart 
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In these conditions, 'regional' identity itself—where it is most 
genuinely felt—often appears to crystallize at a level lower than 
the Land: so to speak, around the Hunsriick rather than the Rhine- 
Palatinate. Bavaria, the only Land to vote against the Basic Law 
as too centralist, is closer to the exception than the rule in this 
respect. Rather than becoming objects of intense sentimental 
affiliation, the Lander have tended to serve as practical arenas for 
political compensation, in which parties that do not enjoy power 
at the federal level can share or hold it at regional level, providing 
a kind of rebalancing mechanism. On the other hand—here lies a 
second potential irony—the abrupt incorporation of East 
Germany, accomplished with political promises and popular 
acclaim not altogether unlike an earlier union with the Ostmark, 
has unbalanced the Federal Republic. The five new Lander in the 
East, resuscitations of those created—no less artifically than in the 
West—by the DDR in 1949, and abolished by it in 1958, were 
initially the focus of spontaneous attachment by the local popula­
tions, as mementoes of a past that was theirs, however briefly, 
neither ordered by Bonn nor tolerated by Berlin. But the wrench­
ing disruptions that have followed unification are unlikely to leave 
such recent identities unscathed. Today, perhaps, conditions are 
being prepared for the emergence in East Germany of what 
might—once the depths of collective humiliation and disorienta­
tion start to pass—become a true regionalism of major propor­
tions, attracting loyalties across administrative boundaries in a 
common movement against the ills of Western integration.
The conventional comparison of Germany is with Italy. In fact, of 
course, though unification of the two countries was virtually 
simultaneous, the Risorgimento was a process directed against 
foreign powers, dynasties of alien origin protected by them, and 
the church, rather than a rallying of native realms—so involving 
greater resort to political violence and initiative from below. 
Moreover, the weight of Piedmont in Italy was far less than of 
Prussia in Germany. Cavour was therefore never in a position to 
take Bismarck's route, of nesting older principalities within the 




























































































deriving its administrative models from Napoleonic France, libe­
rator of the 1790's and ally of the 1850's. On the other hand, 
Italian society was vastly more heteroclite in social and cultural 
character than German, and there were Risorgimental politicians 
who doubted the wisdom of imposing a uniform Piedmontese 
straightjacket on the peninsula. In the aftermath of victory in the 
South, Minghetti proposed a more decentralized structure to the 
National Assembly in Turin that divided the country into six re­
gions, with a measure of administrative autonomy. The deputies, 
aware that the social basis of the new state was very shallow, and 
fearful of any risk of fragmentation to it, threw the project 
unceremoniously out. Instead a united Italy was to be governed 
French-style, as a uniform territory of some sixty circumscriptions 
ruled by prefects appointed by the central power. The repre­
sentative basis of the Liberal state remained tightly oligarchic: the 
electorate was no more than two per cent of the population, or 
eight per cent of adult males.
When mass politics started to stir at the turn of the century, 
agitation for regional autonomy predictably surfaced where 
geography and history had created the most distinctive local cul­
tures of major size—in the island societies of Sicily and Sardinia: 
significantly stronger in the latter. But it was not until the after- 
math of the First World War, amidst the general political 
upheaval against the narrow framework of the Giolittian order, 
with the foundation of the Partito Popolare by Sturzo and the rise 
of Lussu's Party of Action in Sardinia, that decentralization 
became an issue at national level. In 1921, the last year of the 
Liberal regime, a commission set up by the Italian parliament 
reported on the question—just before fascism swept to power, 
crushing all regional impulses with a stronger central hand than 
ever before.
Twenty years later, the collapse of Mussolini's regime posed the 
same question as in Germany. What kind of democracy would be 
constructed after the destruction of fascism? Once again, as after 




























































































Italy, the Allies had no fear of a come-back by the extreme right, as 
in Germany. What alarmed them was the strength of the 
militant—Communist and Socialist—left. For their part the 
Christian Democrats were committed, as Sturzo's heirs, to the 
principle of regional autonomy, but had no wish to allow the Left 
to control the large areas of Italy where it was likely to be the 
leading force. The Left, while accepting the need for decentral­
ization, was more concerned to give the new Constitution a social 
than a federal emphasis. The result was a Charter long on welfare 
promises and short on administrative reforms. Regional 
conceptions nevertheless could not be simply archivized, for two 
reasons. In the South the Anglo-American landings in Sicily had 
released a separatist movement on the island, briefly encouraged 
by the Allies, that still had embers of support when the War ended. 
In the borderlands of the North, on the other hand, there were 
allogenous cultural groups which had been severely repressed by 
fascism, and over which neighbouring states—in the first instance, 
France and Austria—had potential claims.8 For reasons of 
prudence, as much as principle, a measure of autonomy could not 
be denied the islands and enclaves within a democratic order. 
Hence in the wake of the Liberation special statutes were created 
for Sicily and Sardinia (whose roles were now reversed—the 
latter, having had less opportunity to stir in 1943-45, received 
fewer concessions than the former), and the French- and German­
speaking communities of Val d'Aosta and Alto Adige, even before 
Italy had acquired its post-war Constitution.
When the Constituent Assembly met in 1946, the experience of the 
Resistance was still fresh, and a coalition including Socialists and 
Communists as well as the Christian Democrats still ruled the 
country. Determined to prevent any regression to the authoritar­
ian past, all parties concurred in devising a constitution that
8 For particulars, see Ernest Weibel, La création des régions à statut 




























































































deliberately limited the authority of the central executive powers, 
by creating an exceptionally powerful legislature, based on a 
rigorously fair proportional representation. In the same spirit of 
democratic dispersion, theoretical provision was also made for 
the establishment of another fifteen regions covering the whole 
peninsula. Unlike the four regions with a special statute, these did 
not correspond, in most cases, to strong sentiments of collective 
identity. They were simply read off from the compartimenti 
statistici into which Italy had been divided in the the first years of 
Piedmontese rule, for the purposes of administrative convenience. 
Opponents of regional autonomy in the Constituent Assembly 
made no secret of their satisfaction at the multiplication of units 
envisaged—eventually twenty, or twice the number of Lander in 
West Germany, with its larger population. The more they were— 
so opponents of decentralization calculated, not for the last 
time—the weaker they would be.9 In the event, the political 
polarization of the country, and the decisive victory of the DC in 
the elections of April 1948, ensured that the standard—as distinct 
from special—regions remained a dead letter in Italy.
It was not until twenty years later that the regioni were finally 
activated. If their conception lay in the popular awakening of the 
Resistance, their actual birth was forced by the dramatic insur­
gency of 1968-69, the greatest social convulsion to grip Italian 
society since the war. When the first Centre-Left government had 
been formed in 1963, ending exclusive DC hegemony in Italy, one 
of the Socialist Party's conditions for entry into coalition with the
9 See Ettore Rotelli, L'Avvento della regione in Italia, Milan 1967, 
pp. 356-357. Conversely, the more clear-sighted proponents of 
devolution, most of them Azionisti, wanted fewer regions than were 
actually created. Rotelli himself emphasises how little theoretical or 
empirical reflection there was in this period on the category of the 
region as such. But his account makes clear that it was in the Partito 
d'Azione that most discussion of it developed, with a mixture of 
socialist and federalist accents, that initially linked the principles of 




























































































Christian Democrats had been implementation of the constitu­
tional promise of regions. But nothing was done about them, as 
the DC dragged its feet, until the explosion at the end of the 
decade. However, once campus revolt had set off a wave of 
strikes and factory occupations without post-war precedent, pit­
ting huge numbers of workers against the employers and the state, 
and unleashing demands for a radical reorganization of relations 
between capital and labour within industry, not to speak of ruled 
and rulers in society at large, the Centre-Left government was 
belatedly forced into action. Its response was two-fold. In May 
1970, it passed the Statuto dei Diritti dei Lavoratori, drafted by 
the socialist lawyer Giugni, granting Italian workers more 
extensive rights in the work-place than at that time in any other 
country of Western Europe; and in the same month, it finally 
enacted legislation to make the regions a reality.10 The connexion 
between the themes of industrial and of territorial democracy was 
thus here even closer than in Germany. Its outcome, however, 
was the opposite. The tumult of the Hot Autumn secured advances 
for Italian labour in many ways beyond the gains made in the late 
forties in Germany. But the realization of the regions did not 
result in a de-concentration of power comparable to that achieved 
in the Federal Republic.
At the outset, few significant capacities were delegated to the new 
regional authorities—although enough resources were granted to 
make them attractive spoils for local office-seekers and their 
clients. Symbolically, the only strong popular response they 
aroused were a year of riots for Reggio Capoluogo in Calabria, 
barricades in protest against the proposed location of the 
capital—hence prebends—of the new region in Catanzaro. 
Eventually, a further round of reforms occurred, now under the 
pressure of the great increase in the Communist vote in the
10 For this turn, see Paul Ginsborg, A History o f  Contemporary Italy, 




























































































elections of 1975-1976. The result of this advance was the 
formation of the Andreotti Cabinets of 'National Solidarity', 
which endowed the regional governments with more substantial 
powers in 1977-1978. The performance of these has been notori­
ously uneven. The extent to which the efficacy and probity of the 
new authorities depends on the economic and civic conditions in 
which they operate, with a marked North-South gradient, has 
long been obvious.11 But it is also clear that everywhere sumps of 
patronage have formed within regional governments. The reve­
lations of Tangentopoli have brought home the degree to which, 
even in the ostensibly advanced North and Centre, regional au­
thorities have often provided a venal facade rather than moral 
anchorage of provincial democracy. Against this background, the 
rise of a genuinely mass regionalist movement, first in the Veneto 
and Lombardy and then across most of Northern Italy, has 
dramatized the gap between the formal structures and lived 
realities of administrative decentralization. But it also, even more 
pointedly, has underscored the continuing macro-division of Italy 
between North and South, whose range of deepening inequalities, 
has been left unaffected—perhaps even aggravated—by meso- 
regional autonomies.
The British case affords a suggestive foil to this history. No two 
starting-points could be more unlike. The early modern English 
monarchy was the most unitary state in Europe, and when its 
development was cut short in the 17th century, the parliamentary 
regime that succeeded it in the 18th century inherited both its 
unique degree of centralism and its unmediated claims of 
sovereignty. Though ventilated and reformed in the 19th century,
11 Robert Putnam's M aking Democracy Work, Princeton 1993, explores 
the reasons for these differences in the richest empirical study of 
regionalizaton to date. Its conclusions, however, present too 
favourable an account of the operation of regional government in the 
more privileged zones of Italy to make the scale of the electoral 




























































































and eventually arrived at universal suffrage in the 20th century, 
these structural traits remained—a parliamentary absolutism that 
has never been restrained either by a codified constitution or a 
significant delegation of powers. At the same time, this unitary 
state has presided over a composite realm, containing three 
allogenous nationalities, distinct by either religion, language or 
law from the dominant English community, in Wales, Ireland and 
Scotland. This has long been a potentially explosive combination.
In the aftermath of the First World War, the British state was 
obliged to disgorge the larger part of Ireland. But it retained most 
of Ulster, where it set up a local assembly that was in effect rigged 
to ensure the dominance of Protestant settlers—a parody of 
regional representation. In the mainland, Wales and Scotland 
continued to be ruled from London, to all intents and purposes as 
if they were simply outlying areas of England. After the Second 
World War the UK, as a victor power exempt from the experience 
of either occupation or resistance, was under no pressure to alter 
its constitutional arrangements. It was not, in fact, until the 
historical moment of 1968-69 that—in Britain too—the underlying 
situation changed. First, Catholic rebellion broke out in Northern 
Ireland, in a civil rights movement against Protestant dominance 
that resulted not in the reconstruction of the local assembly, but its 
suspension, leading to an armed conflict that has lasted over two 
decades. Then in Scotland and Wales, nationalist movements— 
hitherto fitful and marginal—suddenly started to make major 
gains in local elections, threatening the position of the Labour 
government of the time in London, which depended on retention 
of its large majorities in both areas.
The Labour administration responded to Scottish and Welsh stir­
rings by setting up in 1969 an official commission to look into the 
possibility of constitutional reform. Four years later—Labour by 
now out of office—the Kilbrandon Report recommended the 
creation of regional parliaments in Scotland and Wales. By this 
time, however, the scene in England itself had been transformed 




























































































miners' strike, plunging the country into a state of emergency, 
toppled the Conservative government. But the elections of 
February 1974, which the Conservatives lost, did not give Labour 
a parliamentary majority—in part, because the nationalist parties 
of Scotland and Wales had doubled their vote. For the next five 
years Labour ruled as a minority government, dependent for its 
survival on toleration by the nationalist bloc in the Commons. To 
appease Scottish and Welsh demands, the Cabinet eventually 
introduced bills for regional devolution along the lines of the 
Kilbrandon Report.
Meanwhile, Labour sought to come to terms with the massive 
head of trade-union pressure that had brought it back to power. 
Macro-economic management was coordinated with the TUC, 
for the short-term tasks of controlling inflation and redressing the 
external account, in exchange for welfare concessions. This was 
the 'Social Contract'. Beyond its horizon, however, the Wilson 
government set up another official commission to report on ways 
of furthering industrial democracy in Britain. In 1976, this body 
published its report. Its chief recommendation was that employees 
in any firm with a work-force of over two thousand personnel 
should have equal representation with share-holders on its board 
of management. Business reaction to the Bullock Report was 
immediate and violent. The employers' federation raised such a 
storm of protest that the government—retreating hastily—buried 
the proposals. At the same time, reaction to the legislation 
prompted by the Kilbrandon Report was not much less vehement 
in the British Parliament.12 There it was eventually torpedoed by
12 For the common discomfort which the two issues aroused within the 
Callaghan government, even among its more radical members, see 
Tony Benn, Conflicts o f  Interest - Diaries 1976-1980, London 1990, 
pp. 11-12. The entry for January 20 1977 reads:
Cabinet, and we had a revealing discussion on the Bullock Report 
which has just been published. Jim said this was an explosive issue. 
It could be like the Tory Industrial Relations Act. He was afraid it 
would cause polarization... Then we came to devolution and I




























































































unionist manoeuvres from within the Labour delegation itself. 
The price of this centralism was the end of the government. Once 
the bills for Scottish and Welsh devolution were destroyed in this 
way, the nationalist MPs from both regions voted against 
the Labour administration, and in the spring of 1979 the 
Callaghan administration fell. In the elections that followed, 
capital, traumatized by the spectre of the Bullock Report—a 
recipe, as one industrialist put it, for another East Germany— 
mobilized with ferocity behind the new Conservative leader, 
Margaret Thatcher.13 The results of her victory are well-known: 
trade-union power was rolled back relentlessly in industry, and 
unswervingly centralist rule maintained in Scotland and Wales.
The Labour Party, out of office now for fourteen years, has in 
opposition has once again endorsed the principle of regional 
devolution in Britain. Now, however, it speaks of creating 
regional authorities, not just for Scotland and Wales, but within 
England as well. Since there is little popular demand for the latter, 
because of the deeply-entrenched unitary tradition of English 
political culture, the proposal for multiplication of regional bodies 
beyond the two historic nationalities of Scotland and Wales has 
been greeted with some suspicion in the latter, as a possible intent 
to noyer le poisson—that is, to scale down the powers that might 
be granted to Edinburgh and Cardiff by assimilating them to those 
judged appropriate for Exeter or Norwich. The problem here, of 
course, is a general one wherever the trigger for devolution is the 
special position of allogenous cultural communities—should there
raised one point—that in the provision for a referendum there 
should also be a referendum for electors in England. I said I forecast 
we wouldn't get through a bill under which the English were not 
allowed to vote.
13 'Mrs Thatcher is all that stands between [us] and a rapid slide into a 
down-market version of the German Democratic Republic': see Colin 
Leys, 'Thatcherism and British Manufacturing: A Question of 




























































































be 'symmetrication' of regional representation throughout the 
state, even where demand for it is low, or not? For the moment, 
the question remains academic in the United Kingdom. If the 
British case exhibits, once again, a close coincidence of pressures 
for regional and for industrial democracy, coming from below and 
forcing their way onto official agendas above, it is the failure of 
both that is striking. In Britain, the unitary cast of parliamentary 
sovereignty was intrinsically stronger than that of any continental 
state, while the turbulence of the late sixties and early seventies— 
a post-war peak by national standards—was still fairly limited by 
international ones.
The contrast with France is instructive. Often regarded as the 
most incorrigibly centralized of major European states, France 
today possesses twenty-two regional assemblies—about the same 
number as Italy. How did it acquire these? The origins of regional 
reform in France are more unequivocal than in any other country. 
Unlike the situation in Britain, the agitation of allogenous cultural 
communities—Corsican, Breton, Alsatian or other—was not the 
precipitating factor. Decisive was rather the political earthquake 
of May-June 1968. Rising in revolt against traditional authority 
and modern capital alike, students and workers came close to 
overthrowing the Gaullist regime, and perhaps the Fifth Republic 
altogether. De Gaulle's political response, already in the last week 
of May, and reiterated on his return from Germany, was to 
promise France a society based on the idea of 'participation'. In 
September 1968, he left no doubt what he meant by this: rights of 
workers in enterprises, represented by elected delegates, to the 
same kind of say in their management as enjoyed by share­
holders. How was to be achieved? Through the mechanism—here 
the specific traits of French state tradition made themselves felt— 
of an affirmative referendum.
The reaction of the French business class, and more widely of con­
servative opinion, was consternation. Pompidou, who had saved 
the regime in May-June, told a journalist: 'The General is dream­




























































































leave of his senses; and when questioned by De Gaulle himself, 
Pompidou told him bluntly that the scheme amounted to either 
'Sovietization' or anarchism.14 Within the government, legal 
difficulties were alleged, while outside the patronat raised the 
alarm. The result was a sudden switch. Three months later, it was 
announced that the subject of the referendum would not be 
participation in the economic enterprise after all, but in the 
territorial region. De Gaulle now proposed creating twenty-one 
regions with local assemblies, and the transformation of the 
national Senate into a body representing the regions. The 
'permutability' of industrial and regional democracy could not be 
better illustrated—the one functioning here as direct surrogate for 
the other. The upshot is well-known. When De Gaulle made the 
reform a question of confidence, the whole of the Left voted 
against it, joined by the sector of the Right dismayed by the idea of 
participation as such, and the referendum was defeated, bringing 
De Gaulle's rule to an end in the spring of 1969. For all the 
differences of circumstance, the parallelism with the fall of 
Callaghan's government ten years later is eerie.
The sequel, however, diverged. Pompidou, after tacitly helping to 
dispose of De Gaulle, won the Presidency as the heir to his cause, 
and so was politically obliged to make some gesture to the 
principle of decentralization. The result was the administrative 
reform of 1972-3 which brought twenty-two French regions for­
mally into existence, with elected councils but virtually no powers. 
The territories into which the hexagon was divided did not 
correspond to the historic provinces of France, but were simply 
taken from the bureaucratic units that had been created for the 
purposes of local economic planning by Edgar Faure in 1955. This 
arbitrary découpage had been adopted for De Gaulle's proposal in 
1969, and was modified only by the detachment of Corsica from





























































































the 'region' of Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur. Once this token 
measure was passed, the Right ignored the issue for the rest of the 
decade.
When the Socialists came to power in 1981, democratization re­
turned to the agenda. Programmatically, economy and territory 
once again emerged in syntony as fields of reform under 
Mitterrand's presidency. But the popular impulse behind the new 
regime was weak, and the outcome reflected the lack of any major 
social groundswell from below. Legislation to give the work-force 
greater rights in the enterprise, the lois Auroux, was altogether 
more modest than De Gaulle's 'dream', giving somewhat greater 
space to trade-unions which were losing in numbers and strength 
anyway. Decentralization—la grande affaire du septennat, as 
Mitterrand unwisely described it—went further, endowing the 
regions with new assemblies and resources, and reducing the 
power of prefects within them, as well as granting Corsica a 
special statute.15 But the funds available to the regions have 
remained limited, and their functions vague. The one clear-cut 
consequence of the reform—as in Italy—was a sharp rise in the 
costs of intermediate government, as the new regional authorities 
launched on a wave of imposing head-quarters and expanded 
pay-rolls. Regional devolution in France, with its powerful 
tradition of uniform civil administration, so far seems rather to 
have ineffectually mimicked, than counter-acted, Parisian 
centralism. Significantly, Mitterrand's arrangements have made 
no attempt to entrench regional representation at national level, 
as De Gaulle's proposed reform of the Senate—much decried at 
the time—once proposed to do.
In Spain, finally, royal centralization came a century later than in 
France, with the arrival of Bourbon rule in the 18th century, and
15 For a sober early view of the reforms, see Yves Meny, 'Decentralisation 





























































































was superimposed on a society that was economically and cul­
turally far less unified. In the 19th century, Spanish absolutism 
was neither overthrown from below, as in France, nor successfully 
modernized and mediated from above, as in Prussia or Piedmont. 
Rather it was broken from without by Napoleonic invasion, which 
brought a Spanish liberalism into being that after 1815 was always 
strong enough to prevent any effective restoration of the absolute 
monarchy, but too weak to stabilize a constitutional regime. The 
result of this impasse was repeated break-down of public order, 
military pronunciamento and civil war. In these conditions, of 
weakened central power, the regional divisions within Spain were 
bound to find increasing expression. One result was that Spain 
became the only major European country in the 19th century to 
produce a strong federalist movement, proclaiming itself such, 
and briefly presiding over the First Republic in 1873-74—whose 
leading light Pi y Margall invoked the authority of Proudhon. 
Another was the early emergence of nationalist parties in the two 
major allogenous communities, Catalonia and the Basque lands, 
by the 1890's.
But so long as the dominant forms of politics remained narrowly 
clientelistic, based on a caciquismo more restrictive even than that 
of Italian versions, the traditional forces of Spanish centralism— 
Castilian landowners and bureaucrats, the Army, the Church— 
could still, whatever their own differences, prevail. The end of the 
semi-parliamentary monarchy that capped this oligarchic order 
only led to more, not less, concentration of power in Madrid under 
the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in the 1920's. It was not until 
the unexpected loss of royal nerve in 1931, and the sudden 
apparition of the Second Republic, that mass politics really burst 
onto the peninsular stage. Amidst the many expressions of a new 
democratic ferment, the most resolute and immediate was the 
declaration of Catalan independence in Barcelona, on the day the 
king fled Madrid. Proclaimed by the Esquerra, the leading force of 
the Republican Left in Catalonia, the declaration was later pro­
visionally withdrawn in exchange for a Statute of Autonomy, ap­
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ratified in 1936 by the Cortes. The Constitution of the Republic 
defined Spain as an 'integral' state—a formula intended to steer 
between unitary and federal definitions, allowing regions the 
'right' of autonomy without enacting it. In the event, of the other 
potential candidates, only the Basque lands acquired a statute, 
after the outbreak of the Civil War which destroyed the Republic.
Once Nationalist forces had conquered the country, Franco's dic­
tatorship reverted to a centralism a I'outrance, suppressing every 
trace of provincial autonomy—except in Navarre, as recompense 
for its contribution to the Crusade against the Republic. Catalan 
and Basque lands were singled out for vindictive treatment, as 
bastions of Republican resistance. For thirty years, Spain was 
ruled by a regime which formally identified authority and unity, 
denouncing democracy and autonomy as equally disintegrative of 
the organic being of the Spanish nation. It was not until the last 
decade of Franco's rule that cultural repression of regional iden­
tities was to some extent relaxed, although centralization of po­
litical power never altered. By the time Franco died, however, 
economic and social development of the country—very rapid after 
the late fifties—made a continuation of his dictatorial legacy 
impossible.
The transition to a democratic order, skilfully piloted from above 
by Adolfo Suarez, was in these conditions inseparable from a 
decentralization. The one memory of the Republic that could not 
be cancelled in the new monarchy was the expression of Catalan 
and Basque identities. The establishment of representative 
democracy could not avoid satisfaction of the demands of the na­
tional movements in these two areas. The Constitution negotiated 
in 1978, acknowledging the 'right of nationalities and regions to 
autonomy', created a mechanism for either to acquire an 
'Autonomous Community'—a term chosen to finesse the dis­
tinction between the two—equipped with its own elective bodies 
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seventeen regions to this end.16 In practice, the overwhelming 
pressure for these provisions came from Basque and Catalan na­
tional forces, each of which obtained Special Statutes in the 
summer of 1979. The Suarez government, once it had conceded 
these, attempted to brake the extension of autonomy to Galicia 
and then—more flagrantly—to Andalucia in early 1980. Discre­
dited by the manoeuvres to which it resorted in the South, it fell 
soon afterwards.
The Socialist Party, which had defended Andalucian autonomy 
(the region was a PSOE stronghold), swept the 1982 elections. Its 
victory led to an avalanche of further demands for decentraliza­
tion, which by the end of 1983 had converted all seventeen regions 
into autonomous communities, regardless of their different ori­
gins. Here the logic of 'symmetrication' played itself out to the full, 
powerfully assisted by the fact that the PSOE enjoyed the fruits of 
office in well over half the new regional governments. Outside the 
historic nationalities, the spoils of intermediate office have—as in 
Italy—often been disproportionately visible in the outcome of this 
devolution. The system, with its built-in tension between cultural 
and territorial units, has not reached stabilization—as the current 
Catalan demand for a larger share of tax revenues, to the 
discontent of regions like Estremadura, makes plain.
16 In 1928, Ortega—denouncing the artificial multiplication of provinces 
in Spain as 'un torpe tatuaje con que se ha maculado la piel de la 
Peninsula'—proposed the creation of ten 'grandes comarcas' to ensure 
effective regional self-government. He later explained that he had 
used the archaism 'comarca' to 'camouflage the figure of the region', 
under Primo's dictatorship—but in vain, since Primo had personally 
censored the concluding article in El Sol in which he had advanced 
the notion. Obras Complétas, Vol XI, pp. 255-261, 176. Ortega's list of 
regions makes an interesting comparison with today's 'autonomous 
communities': those it does not include are Navarre, Rioja, Leon, 
Madrid, Murcia, and the Balearic and Canary Islands. In 1873, Pi y 
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4. Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from this briefest of surveys? Our 
initial surmise appears to be confirmed. In the larger West 
European states, the post-war advance of regionalization has 
been a function of democratization. In Germany, Italy and Spain, 
the impulse towards regional devolution sprang from the reaction 
against fascism, when democratic constitutions were adopted 
after the experience of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco. In France 
and Britain, it arose from the social turbulence of the late sixties 
and early seventies, when radical pressure for liberties beyond the 
agenda of parliaments or presidents shook the established order. 
These were still stronger in Italy, where the second wave of 1968- 
1970 gave effect to the promises of the first wave of 1945-47. From 
the beginning, moreover, there was a constitutive ambiguity in the 
role of 'territorial' democracy, since it nearly always emerged in 
conjunction, or tension, with the idea of 'industrial' democracy— 
two notions with significant common origins in the nineteenth 
century. The connexion between them can be seen again and 
again, in Germany, Italy, Britain and France. At critical points, 
however, the first could in practice become, not a condition or 
complement, but a substitute for the second, as most graphically in 
the French case. The exception, where the thematic linkage 
between the two kinds of democratization was largely missing, is 
Spain. The reasons for its absence there are no doubt related to 
the distinctive way in which the Franquista dictatorship came to 
an end: not destroyed by war or revolution, but mediated by the 
regime itself. The Spanish opposition of the late seventies was too 
concerned about the danger of a military come-back (which 
occurred, but as farce not tragedy), to press labour demands: the 
statute of Catalonia was to be remembered, its collectives 
forgotten.
But if the pattern of democratic pressures explains the way that 
regions emerged onto the political agenda in these countries, the 
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the outcome. Germany had the strongest heritage of entrenched 
territorial particularism; Spain the most vivid legacy of protest 
against administrative centralism; Italy the greatest internal 
disparity of economic conditions. By contrast, France and Britain 
possessed the most unitary political pasts. Filtered through these 
grids, waves of democratization that differed in timing and 
strength yielded quite distinct results. But the hierarchy of effec­
tive regionalization in these states today corresponds closely to 
the institutional and ideological bequests of an earlier age. There 
is a simple way of assessing of the relative vitality of the regional 
structures of the major West European countries. It was Max 
Weber who remarked that: 'The financial relationships are what 
most decisively determine the real structure of a federal govern­
ment',17 and the same can be said of regional government, what­
ever its juridical forms. Today, the share of public expenditure 
controlled by the Lander and communes in West Germany is 
nearly 60 per cent; that controlled by the Autonomous Commu­
nities in Spain about 25 per cent; by the regioni in Italy perhaps 15 
per cent; by the regions in France a mere 2 per cent; while in 
Britain, there are as yet no regions at all.18 Such is the real gamut 
of regionalization in the Community.
Within this general history, a special role has fallen to allogenous 
cultural communities within the larger nation-states. These have
17 'Deutschlands Künftige Staatsform', Gesammelte politische Schaften, 
Tübingen 1971, p. 480.
18 For these shares, see Roland Sturm, 'Budgetary Politics in the Federal 
Republic of Germany', West European Politics, July 1985, pp. 57-58; and 
Paul Romus, L'Europe régionale, Brussels 1990, pp. 88, 90, 92. 
Calculations vary according to authority—Putnam, for example, gives 
a higher figure for Italy (Making Democracy Work, p. 22), where 
certain central items are passed on by the regions. Another index of 
the hierarchy would be juridical. Only in Germany and Spain do the 
regions have the power to determine their own constitutions. In 
France and Italy, they received a uniform statute from the centre 
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typically acted as 'triggers' for a more general devolution, whose 
principles may actually have little to do with the motivation of the 
original claimants to autonomy. This process has been clearest in 
Italy and Spain, and remains potentially replicable in Britain. 
There are, of course, different kinds of allogenous communities, 
which a typology of regional identities—the task alluded to 
earlier—would have to discriminate. If language is certainly the 
strongest cultural bond for the formation of a separate identity in 
these cases, it is not the only possible one: a prior history of 
political independence, distinct legal and educational institutions, 
or discrepant religious attachment, may be others. In Italy, three 
small border regions sharing an idiom with neighbouring 
countries, each a potential zone of territorial contention, gave an 
important impetus to the allowance for regions in the post-war 
Constitution. In Spain, there was no frontier pressure, but two 
large communities with distinct languages and historic memories, 
one of them long an independent state, both among the richest 
parts of the country. Here the allogenous groups had developed 
strong national movements, setting them apart from any equiva­
lent in Italy, without necessarily aiming at full independence.19 In 
Britain, two major communities—one with a strong area of 
distinct idiom, the other with a memory of early modern statehood 
and a native legal system—are more akin to the Spanish cases. 
The relation between Scotland and Wales has been not altogether 
unlike that of Catalonia to the Basque lands, but their strategic 
position within the UK much weaker. In France, no allogenous 
community was strong enough to trigger a devolutionary process. 
At most, Corsica was able to effect the single modification made to 
an originally economic division of the national territory, when 
regional authorirties were created, and to secure a special statute.
19 It is, of course, a historical error to think that national movements 
have invariably aimed at national independence. For a general 
analysis of their classical forms in Europe, see the remarkable essay by
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Conventional opinion today has moved sharply against the idea 
of 'natural' regions, discounted as mythical units, in the name of 
the historical contingencies that can shape local landscapes and 
mentalities alike.20 For all the force of such arguments, it is still 
necessary to note that there is in fact one kind of region that is 
fairly straightforwardly demarcated by nature: namely islands. 
These have, in fact, been more or less regularly accepted by even 
the most centralized states as special cases, with regional identi­
ties of their own. Sicily and Sardinia acquired their statutes before 
the writing of the Italian Constitution; Corsica won a position 
apart from the mainland regions; the Canaries continue to display 
a vigorous autonomism; even in the centralized United Kingdom, 
the Channel Islands and Isle of Man have been permitted every 
kind of juridical anomaly. But—as the British example indicates— 
insular (or sub-insular) identities, if they are visibly special, can by 
the same token be more easily segegrated: they do not have the 
same triggering power as exceptions on the mainland.
The characteristic effect of the allogenous community, where its 
demands can no longer be resisted by the central state, is a process 
of symmetrication. Partly as dilution from above, partly as 
emulation from below, areas that have hitherto shown little or no 
desire for administrative autonomy acquire it, as regional 
devolution becomes generalized beyond the special territories 
originally demanding it. At the limit, pure bureaucratic fiat, can 
create entities no-one had ever imagined before. It is clear how 
much the character of actual regional identities must vary, within
Miroslav Hroch, 'From National Movement to the Fully-Formed 
Nation', New Left Review, No. 198, March-April 1993, pp. 3-20.
20 For an illuminating account of debates over the idea of natural region 
in France, see Roger Chartier, 'Science sociale et découpage régional - 
note sur deux débats (1820-1920)', Actes de la recherche en sciences 
sociales, No. 35, November 1980, pp. 27-36, which takes a calmer view 
of the geographers' category than Bourdieu's contribution in the same 



























































































- 3 7 -
such a process. But it would be wrong to assume that the span of 
intensities will necessarily remain as wide as it is now. One of the 
central lessons of the comparative literature on the formation of 
national identity is that, amidst the variety of forces determining 
such identities across the globe—language, geography, economy, 
history, religion—there is one that can operate even in the absence 
of every other, more obviously propitious condition: namely, 
common administrative experience. The modern history of sub- 
Saharan Africa is particularly striking in this regard. Might the 
same prove true of modern regional identity too? If the 
demarcation of regions has most often been arbitrary in its 
origins, only seldom answering to any overwhelming sense of 
collective belonging in the zones concerned, the very fact of their 
institutionalization may tend over time to conjure up the identity 
that was once missing. Bourdieu's argument that regional dis­
course is quintessentially performative can be accepted,21 provided 
that we do not attribute magical powers to language as such—as 
he inclines to do—but think of the material interests that over time 
give meaning to administrative boundaries and ad hoc rhetoric. 
This process seems likely to reduce the differences in the pattern of 
regionalization in the larger states of Western Europe.
Finally, how far—it may be asked—do these considerations apply 
to the smaller states of Western Europe? There is no space to 
explore this interesting question here. It is clear, however, that the 
general ideological valorization of the region since the fifties has 
had its effects. Thus two other members of the EC have made 
formal provision for the creation of regions, without actually 
giving effect to them. The Portuguese Charter of 1976 can be 
compared in this regard to the post-war Italian Constitution, al­
though here too the insular rule holds—autonomy has been 
granted to the Azores and Madeira. The Greek loi-cadre of 1986,
21 'La force de la représentation', in Ce que parler veut dire - l'économie 
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by contrast, so far remains without filling—not even Crete has 
received a special statute. On the other hand, in Denmark, Ireland 
or the Netherlands, no such gestures have yet been felt necessary. 
Could this be because, just by virtue of scale, democracy in these 
countries—much older than in Portugal or Greece—is already felt 
to be close enough to the citizenry? If so, this would tend to 
confirm the hypothes is developed here—subject, however, to 
what we might call the Hroch proviso.22 For advanced 
regionalization, of course, has occurred in some small West 
European countries. Belgium is an obvious, if predictable example, 
given the sharp linguistic division of the country. Its principal 
interest lies in the formal distinction that Belgian law, because of 
the mixed character of Brussels, now makes between the concepts 
of 'community' (two) and 'region' (three), each with their own 
rights and revenues—notions that elsewhere, as we have seen, 
are for political reasons typically blurred. More strikingly, how­
ever, but in keeping with Hroch's contention, strong regional 
identities and institutions exist in two states with notably corru­
gated terrain, Austria and Switzerland. In the Alpine lands at 
least, the idea of 'natural regions' may retain its force.
22 In honour of his remark at the October colloquium of the Forum, to 
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